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Abstract
Economists have traditionally assumed that individual behavior is motivated 
exclusively by extrinsic incentives. Social psychologists, in contrast, stress that 
intrinsic motivations are also important. In recent work, economic theorists have 
started to build psychological factors, like intrinsic motivations, into their models. 
Besley and Ghatak (2005) propose that individuals are differently motivated in that 
they have different “missions,” and their self-selection into sectors or organizations 
with matching missions enhances organizational efficiency. We test Besley and 
Ghatak’s model using data from a unique cohort study. We generate two proxies for 
intrinsic motivations: a survey-based measure of the health professionals 
philanthropic motivations and an experimental measure of their pro-social 
motivations. We find that both proxies predict health professionals’ decision to 
work in the non-profit sector. We also find that philanthropic health workers 
employed in the non-profit sector earn lower wages than their colleagues.
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1. Introduction 
According to social psychologists an individual performing whatever act will 
look for two kinds of justifying rationale: extrinsic incentives and intrinsic 
motivations. Edward L. Deci (1975) wrote that “one is said to be intrinsically 
motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the 
activity itself”.  Economists rarely account for intrinsic motivations, although recently 
some have started building them into theoretical models and investigating them 
experimentally.
1
Intrinsic motivations may be especially relevant in social service, particularly 
in teaching and healthcare, both traditionally described as vocations. Delfgauuw and 
Dur (2008), Prendergast (2007) and Francois (2000) have shown that intrinsically 
motivated public service providers exert more effort and require fewer extrinsic 
incentives than self-interested providers. Besley and Ghatak (2005) (B&G) propose an 
alternative perspective in which both workers and organizations vary with respect to 
their missions; one sector of an economy might be oriented towards standard profit-
maximization, another towards philanthropic endeavours, a third towards social 
efficiency and functionality, a fourth towards beauty and the arts, and so on. B&G 
show that mission diversity within a society enhances productivity through the 
matching of employers and employees with similar missions.  
Our paper empirically explores whether, in the spirit of B&G, young, 
Ethiopian, philanthropically or pro-socially motivated health professionals self-select 
into the non-profit sector as opposed to the public and for-profit sectors and whether 
mission-matching increases organizational efficiency. At first glance it may seem odd 
that we group the public health sector with the private for-profit sector rather than the 
non-profit sector. In principle, we would expect the public sector and public servants 
to be motivated by the notion of public service, a mission that, especially in a poor 
country, seems closer to pro-sociality and philanthropy than profit maximization. 
However, in Ethiopia, the original mission of the public sector, to provide adequate 
health services to all segments of the population, has been eroded by decades of 
central planning, weak monetary incentives and poor accountability, leading to 
1 Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide an extensive review of the experimental literature on non-monetary  
motives driving human behavior in a number of situations.  4
widespread opportunism on the part of public healthcare providers (see Lindelow and 
Serneels, 2006).
Measuring pro-social and philanthropic motivations is challenging. Proxies 
have been derived from individuals’ responses to specially designed survey 
questions,
2 but these can be susceptible to response bias. An alternative approach 
relies on observing individuals’ actual choices (‘revealed preferences’).  Gregg et al. 
(2007), for instance, measure such motivations as the number of unpaid extra hours of 
work. They find that workers in the British non-profit and public sectors “donate” 
more labor than those in the for-profit sector and that this is primarily due to selection. 
However, the validity of this approach depends on our willingness to accept unpaid 
extra hours worked as a proxy for pro-social or philanthropic motivations.
Here, we use a survey-based measure and a measure derived using a third, to 
date untested, approach: we use an economic experiment to measure individual pro-
sociality in a controlled environment.
3
Our results provide support for B&G’s theory. Both of our motivational 
proxies predict working in the non-profit sector. The results also support the 
prediction that mission matching “economizes on the need for high-powered extrinsic 
incentives” (B&G, p.616) as we find evidence that non-profit employers pay lower 
salaries to philanthropically motivated health workers, reserving higher salaries for 
more competent health workers.  
Further analysis shows that controlling for whether a health worker received 
his or her medical education at a non-profit-run college suppresses the pro-social and 
philanthropic motivation results, suggesting that the mission-matching may actually 
occur at college entry or that colleges socialize individuals into different missions and 
that, either way, employers know that the type of college attended relates to individual 
motivations.  
  The paper has six sections. Section 2 reviews the literature on motivations and 
the non-profit sector and introduces the Ethiopian context.  Section 3 describes our 
data, including our proxies for philanthropic motivations. Section 4 presents our 
empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2 The public administration literature provide examples of survey-based multi item proxies of “public 
service motivation”. See Perry (1996) for details. 
3 For a recent discussion of the application of laboratory experiments to the social sciences see Falk and 
Heckman (2009).   5
2. Intrinsic motivations and the non-profit sector 
2.1. The non-profit sector 
There are three important institutional differences between non-profit and for-
profit firms: 1) non-profit firms need donations for their initial equity capital, 2) they 
cannot distribute revenues in the form of cash dividends, and 3) they cannot be 
liquidated for proceeds to be paid to the firms’ owners (Pauly, 1987). The exclusion 
of profit-maximization from the objectives of non-profit firms raises questions about 
why they exist and why the sector has grown so rapidly in both developed and 
developing countries. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1996) suggests three possible answers: 
trust, generosity and ideology. Trust and generosity come into play when customers 
and donors have imperfect information about service quality: in these settings, 
knowledge of the inability of the owners to expropriate revenues may drive customers 
and donors towards the non-profit sector.
4 Ideology refers to non-profit entrepreneurs 
who have a mission other than profit-maximization and want to operate without being 
held accountable to profit-seeking investors. However, non-profit entrepreneurs do 
not need to be ideologically motivated; if they are not, ex-ante soft incentives may 
lead to ex-post opportunistic behaviour, resulting in “for-profits in disguise”.
5 While 
the non-profit sector does not require a pro-social or philanthropic mission in order to 
exist, a subsector, namely the NGO sector, does.
6
  The John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies has documented the NGO 
sectors of several high income countries. NGOs in developing countries, especially in 
Africa, have received less attention, although Leonard (2002) reports on the wide 
diffusion of NGO health providers in Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  In Zimbabwe, 
for instance, NGOs provide 35 percent of all hospital beds; moreover, 95 percent of 
the NGOs facilities are located in rural areas, suggesting a strong commitment to 
reach those most in need. Reinnika and Svensson (2008) analyze the role of intrinsic 
4 Asymmetric information plays a crucial role especially in the provision of health care. See Arrow 
(1963). 
5 See Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) for a recent theoretical analysis of the possible motives of nonprofit 
entrepreneurs.  Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2004) link this to accountability and provide unique 
evidence for the Ugandan non-profit sector. 
6 We use the terms non-profit, and NGO interchangeable in this paper, since the Ethiopian health non-
profit sector exists overwhelmingly of NGOs.  6
motivations to serve the poor among religious non-profit health care providers in 
Uganda.
2.2 The Ethiopian context 
Ethiopia ranks among the worst countries in the world in terms of health 
service coverage and health outcomes.
7 Per capita health expenditures are 
approximately 25 USD PPP, which is significantly lower than the Sub-Sahara Africa 
average of 89 USD PPP (World Bank 2004). The number of health workers per capita 
- 11 nurses and 2 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants – remains extremely low even by 
African standards. 
As in most low income countries, the Ethiopian health sector is dominated by 
the public sector: in our data 73% of nurses and 82% of doctors work for the public 
sector. However, both the for-profit and non-profit sectors are growing. The estimated 
number of NGOs working in Ethiopia exceeds 3000, is rising, and includes a majority 
involved in health care.
8
As elsewhere, organizations in the public, for-profit and non-profit sectors 
have very different missions. The for-profit sector aims to maximize profits by 
providing healthcare to those able to pay. The formal aim of the public sector is to 
provide health care to all Ethiopians,
9 although this mission has been eroded by 
decades of central planning, weak monetary incentives in the form of low wages and 
poor accountability due to inadequate or inexistent monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.  The current commonly held perception of the public health sector in 
Ethiopia incorporates long waiting times, under-the-table payments, absenteeism and 
moonlighting (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006). In contrast, the non-profit sector has a 
good reputation. Its mission is to serve the poor and vulnerable. The mission 
statements of the NGOs in our sample include statements such as “improve the lives 
of the most vulnerable people”, “reach out to vulnerable populations”, and “combat
the root causes of poverty.” And consistent with this mission, almost half of the 
NGOs in our sample operate in rural areas, where the poorest Ethiopians live. In our 
7 For a detailed discussion of health outcomes and the Ethiopian health system more broadly, see 
World Bank (2004).  
8 See http://www.crdaethiopia.org 
9 The Ministry of Health states its mission as follows: “to improve the health status of the Ethiopian 
people through provision of adequate and optimum quality of promotive, preventive, basic curative and 
rehabilitative health services to all segments of the population.” 7
sample, only 24 and 26 percent of private-for-profit and public sector health facilities 
respectively operate in rural areas.
3. The Data
We use data from the Ethiopian Health Workers Cohort Survey. The first 
wave was conducted in spring 2004 and involved 219 nursing and 90 medical 
students, sampled from eight clinical nursing colleges and three medical faculties 
country-wide. The nursing students were in the final year of their training while the 
medical students were about to enter the one-year internship, which precedes 
graduation.
10 Three years later, the same individuals, by then in paid employment, 
were resurveyed. Our sample represents 49% of the 2003/4 cohort of medical 
students, and an estimated 16% of the 2003/4 cohort of nursing students. In the 
second wave 80% of the nurses and 98% of the medical doctors were traced, giving 
rise to panel data for 177 nurses and 88 doctors. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics 
for these 227 health professionals with complete data, at the time of the first 
interview.     
Table 1 shows that close to 20 percent of the nurses currently work in a non-
profit facility. The proportion of doctors employed in the non-profit sector is 
significantly lower, at 6 per cent.  The net earnings of nurses, i.e., the sum of their 
salaries and benefits, are highest in the non-profit sector. However, on average, nurses 
employed in the non-profit sector work one additional hour per day compared to 
nurses employed in the other two sectors (difference statistically significant at 1 
percent level).  As a consequence, the non-profit sector pays nurses slightly but not 
significantly lower hourly wages compared to the other sectors. In contrast, doctors 
earn most and work the longest hours when employed in the for-profit sector.   
Table 1 also reports the health workers’ performance in a test taken during the 
first wave of the survey.
11 We use the test scores as a measure of competence. On 
average, nurses in the non-profit sector are more competent than their colleagues in 
10Details on the sampling strategy the follow-up process can be found in Serra et al (2010). 
11 To ensure that it took the curriculum and Ethiopian conditions into account, the test was prepared by 
a team from Addis Ababa University who teach nursing and medicine. For more details about the test 
see Serneels et al (2004).. 8
the private for-profit sector and less competent than those in the public sector, 
although the differences are statistically insignificant. Test scores for doctors are also 
not significantly different across sectors.
3.1 Survey-based proxy for philanthropic motivation 
In the first wave survey the students were asked to rank eight job 
characteristics according to their importance to them; “opportunity to help the poor” 
was among the job characteristics. Figure 1 shows that 13 percent of the doctors and 
34 percent of the nurses ranked “opportunity to help the poor” as the most important 
job characteristic. In our analysis below we use an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one when “opportunity to help the poor” is given first place in the ranking. 
However, we acknowledge that individuals’ concerns about their own ideal self-image
- the values or identities that they would like to portray - may have influenced the way 
they responded to this question.
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3.2 Experimentally derived proxy for pro-sociality 
During the first wave of the Cohort Survey, we asked the youngsters to 
participate in a Generalized Trust Game (GTG). In the game, initially designed by 
Buchan, Crosson, and Dawes (2002), a Proposer decides how much (zero to 100 
percent) of her initial cash endowment to send to a Responder, the amount she sends 
is tripled by the experimenter before being passed to the Responder who also receives 
the same initial endowment; then, the Responder is invited to send some portion (zero 
to 100 percent) of the tripled amount to some other Proposer present in the same 
session. In Ethiopia, the Proposers and Responders’ initial endowments were set at 
Birr 40 and each player could send multiples of Birr 10. Proposers made their decision 
by dividing their initial endowment between two envelopes. Responders had to fill out 
a form stating what they would do in the case of each possible amount sent to them, 
before seeing the actual amount sent. This use of the strategy elicitation method 
ensured perfect comparability across Responders. 
We chose the GTG because the decision made by Responders is conceptually 
close to the day-to-day decisions made by health workers; they receive resources, 
12 Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2003), for instance, report significant differences in individuals’ 
answers when asked about the attributes that they preferred in a car  (most answered “environmental 
performance”) and those preferred by their neighbours ( most answered “social status”.) 9
which they are expected to pass on to others. So, we assigned our survey responders 
to the role of Responder and recruited additional youngsters from the same colleges to 
assume the Sender role.
13
Below, we use the sum of the four amounts returned by each Responder 
divided by the sum of the four amounts that could have been sent to each Responder 
as a measure of their willingness to pass on resources entrusted to them. Figure 2 
presents a histogram of these ratios. There is a strong mode at one; 20 percent of the 
students chose to pass on the amount that had been entrusted to them, while keeping 
twice that amount for themselves. Just over ten percent chose to pass on nothing. Just 
under ten percent chose to pass on twice the amount entrusted to them. On average, 
the students chose to return slightly more than the amount sent, while keeping almost 
twice that amount for themselves. 
3.3 Comparing the two measures of intrinsic motivations  
Our two measures of intrinsic motivations have different strengths and 
weaknesses. The survey measure, designed to capture the health workers’ desire to 
provide health care to those most in need, has high apparent salience but may be 
subject to response bias. The experimental measure, designed to capture the health 
workers’ willingness to pass on resources entrusted to them for the greater good, is 
likely to be free of response bias but might not be so salient.   
The two measures have a low and insignificant coefficient of correlation 
(coefficient=0.05, p=0.36) suggesting that they do indeed capture different 
motivations. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Econometric strategy 
To investigate the role of pro-social and philanthropic motivations in the 
career choices of health professionals, we estimate the following equation:  
13 Each medical and nursing student attended an experimental session at their college. A total of 20 
sessions were held, with between 29 and 60 students attending each. All 20 sessions were led by the 
same team comprised of one of the authors and three Ethiopian assistants, who translated into Amharic 
where needed. For further details see Serneels et al. (2004). 10
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where Li is the labor outcome of interest; HELPPOOR is our survey proxy for 
philanthropic motivations; MEANRET is the experimental proxy for pro-social 
motivations; TEST is the test-score measure of competence; X contains demographic 
variables like age, gender and marital status; DOCTOR equals one for doctors and 
zero otherwise.  We estimate a Probit to model sector choice and an OLS regression 
to model their earnings.  
4.2 Empirical results 
Table 2 reports several Probit estimations each taking a dummy equal to one if 
the health worker is employed in the non-profit sector and zero otherwise as the 
dependent variable. Columns 1 to 3 indicate that both motivational proxies are 
significantly associated with choosing to work in the non-profit sector. Column 4 
shows that this result is robust to controlling for competence and individual 
characteristics.  The coefficients on the motivational proxies are large. An individual 
who ranked ‘help the poor’ as most important was 12 percent more likely to be 
working in the non-profit sector. And an individual who, on average, passed on fifty 
percent more than he or she received in the GTG game was 5 percent more likely to 
be working in the non-profit sector than an individual who, on average, passed on 
fifty percent less than he or she received.
14
When, in Column 5, we control for whether the health workers graduated from 
a non-profit-run college, this suppresses the motivation-related results.
15 This last 
finding has three possible interpretations. Since, in our data, graduates from non-
profit-run colleges are significantly more philanthropically and pro-socially 
motivated, being a graduate from an non-profit-run college may serve as a signal for 
intrinsic motivations during the recruitment process. This may occur because non-
profit-run colleges may cause individuals to become more pro-social and 
14 Modelling the choice between the non-profit, public and for-profit sectors using a multinomial Probit 
generates similar marginal effects. Results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
15. Including a full set of college dummies, causes some observations to be dropped and leads to an 
only marginally better fit. 11
philanthropic, or because mission matching may occur at the point of college entry. 
However, we cannot exclude a third explanation: there may be some other reason, 
unrelated to philanthropic and pro-social motivations, why graduates of non-profit-run 
colleges select to work in the non-profit sector. We shall return to this point below.
Turning to hourly earnings, in Table 3, we find, in Column 1, that, in 
accordance with the theory, there are no monetary returns to pro-social or 
philanthropic motivations.  
The second and third column of Table 3 suggest that the non-profit sector pays 
higher salaries than the other sectors. This seems to contradict the prediction of lower 
salaries in the presence of mission-matching. However, the estimates in Column 4 
indicate that the non-profit sector pays lower salaries to health workers who are 
philanthropically motivated and higher salaries to those who are not.
Columns 5, 6 and 7 show that this finding is robust to the inclusion of three 
additional variables: one, TESTxNGO, that controls for whether the non-profit sector 
pays higher wages to more competent individuals; one, NGO college, that controls for 
graduates from non-profit-run colleges earning more or less in any sector; and one, 
NGO college x NGO, that controls for graduates from non-profit-run colleges earning 
more or less in the non-profit sector. In Columns 5 and 6, the first of these three 
additional variables bears a significant positive coefficient, indicating that the non-
profit sector rewards competence with higher pay. The coefficient declines in size and 
becomes insignificant in Column 7, possibly due to the multicollinearity associated 
with including additional interaction terms.  
The robustness of the finding that the non-profit sector pays philanthropically 
motivated individuals less than individuals who are not philanthropically motivated is 
important for two reasons. First, it directly supports B&G’s theory. Second, it goes 
some way to ruling out the third explanation as to why the motivation variables 
become insignificant in the selection Probit when the NGO-college-dummy is also 
included. If, all other things being equal, philanthropic individuals are willing to work 
for non-profit organizations for less pay than individuals who are not philanthropic, 
then it seems highly likely that non-profit organizations will wish to employ the 
philanthropic. Building on this, it seems highly likely that the superior predictive 
power of the NGO college dummy in the selection estimations is because non-profit 
organizations believe that graduates of non-profit-run colleges are more likely to be 
philanthropic.12
To summarize, non-profit health facilities pay philanthropically motivated 
health workers less than they pay other health workers, but are more likely, than for-
profit and public health facilities, to attract philanthropically motivated employees 
nevertheless.
6. Summary and conclusions
While economists have traditionally focused on the role of extrinsic incentives 
for decision making, social psychologists have emphasized the role of intrinsic 
motivations.  Over the last decade, economists have become more appreciative of the 
role of psychological factors in decision-making and have started to integrate them 
into their models. In this paper we empirically investigates the role that intrinsic 
motivations play when young Ethiopian health workers are making career choices. 
More specifically, we investigate whether, in accordance with Besley and Ghatak 
(2005)’s theory of mission-matching, pro-social and philanthropic health 
professionals select the non-profit sector as opposed to the public and private for-
profit sectors. 
We find evidence that philanthropically and pro-socially motivated health 
professionals are more likely to work in the non-profit sector as opposed to the public 
and the for-profit sectors. We also find evidence that non-profit employers pay 
philanthropically motivated health professionals lower wages than they pay health 
professionals who are not philanthropically motivated. The strength of the second 
finding lends additional support to the first and this, in turn, leads us to conclude that 
non-profit employers use attendance at a non-profit-run college as a sign of 
philanthropic and, possibly, pro-social motivations. This is appropriate as non-profit-
run college graduates are indeed more philanthropic and pro-social than other 
graduates.
Future investigations into the origins and the evolution of intrinsic motivations 
would be extremely valuable, as most countries, like Ethiopia, face the challenge to 
provide health care within stringent budget constraints.  If intrinsic motivations are 
internalized through education and socialization, interventions that build intrinsic 
motivations among medical and nursing students may be an effective way forward.  
If, on the other hand, motivations are formed at an early age and constitute 13
individuals’ personality traits, policies should aim at improving mission-matching 
between employers and employees. 
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Figure 1: The most important job characteristic 
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Table 1:
Student characteristics 









Personal characteristics       
Age in 2004 (years)  22.32  3.26  23.34  1.53 
Female 0.51  0.50  0.14  0.35 
married 0.10  0.30  0.04  0.21 
        
help the poor  0.28  0.45  0.14  0.35 
mean return in Generalized Trust Game 1.02  0.70  1.19 0.58 
    attended NGO college  0.21  0.41  -  - 
     
sector of work       
private for profit sector  0.07    0.12   
public sector  0.73    0.82   
NGO sector  0.19    0.06   
        
net monthly wage       
private for profit sector  1163  632  4677  1770 
public sector  723  221  2050  533 
NGO sector  1352  959  4279  2088 
        
working hours per day       
private for profit sector  8.45  1.21  10  2.21 
public sector  8.57  1.60  9.13  2.62 
NGO sector  9.47  2.21  9  1.73 
     
ln(hourly wage)       
private for profit sector  4.85  0.37  6.11  0.33 
public sector  4.42  0.28  5.41  0.36 
NGO sector  4.82  0.58  6.09  0.51 
        
competence as measured by test score       
private for profit sector  0.36  0.11  0.64  0.06 
public sector  0.43  0.08  0.61  0.07 
NGO sector  0.40  0.09  0.61  0.04 
        
number of observations  143    84   
     17
Table 2:
Sector choice and intrinsic motivation 
Dependent variable:  
Dummy equal to 1 if the health professional works in an NGO facility
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
HELPPOOR 0.14**    0.12**  0.12**  0.06 
 (0.06)    (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.055) 
MEANRET   0.07**  0.06**  0.05* 0.01 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.030) 
TEST       -0.30  -0.19 
       (0.26)  (0.247) 
Female       0.01  0.01 
       (0.05)  (0.046) 
Age       0.01**  0.01 
       (0.01)  (0.007) 
Married       -0.11***  -0.09*** 
       (0.03)  (0.034) 
NGO college          0.38*** 
         (0.105) 
DOCTOR -0.10**  -0.14***  -0.11*** -0.06  0.03 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.076) 
          
Observations 227  227  227  226  226 
Marginal effects reported Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 18
Table 3:
Wages and intrinsic motivations 
Dependent Variable:  
Log of hourly wage
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
HELPPOOR   -0.01  -0.08  -0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.03 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
MEANRET 0.00 -0.03  -0.03 -0.04  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
TEST   0.61*  0.53  0.47 0.28  0.29  0.39 
   (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.36) 
NGO   0.44***  0.45***  0.66***  0.15  0.13  0.31 
   (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.22)  (0.31)  (0.35)  (0.38) 
Female     -0.10  -0.12**  -0.12**  -0.12**  -0.11* 
     (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Age     -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Married     0.03  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04 
     (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
HELPPOOR x NGO        -0.57***  -0.52***  -0.52***  -0.48*** 
       (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
MEANRET x NGO        0.04  0.02  0.02  0.05 
       (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
TEST x NGO          1.14*  1.17*  0.88 
         (0.66)  (0.68)  (0.72) 
NGO college            0.03  0.10 
           (0.09)  (0.10) 
NGO college*NGO           -0.24 
             (0.19) 
DOCTOR  1.01*** 0.94*** 0.92***  0.93***  0.94*** 0.95*** 0.93*** 
 (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Constant 4.53***  4.25***  4.41***  4.43***  4.50***  4.51***  4.43*** 
 (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.28) 
Observations 227  227  226  226  226  226  226 
R-squared 0.58  0.63  0.64  0.66  0.66  0.66  0.67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 